委内瑞拉烧毁天然气和现金

作为世界第七大天然气储量的所在地,这个欧佩克成员国面临着严重的火炬燃烧问题,如果这一问题得到解决,它可以将其陆上伴生气生产货币化。

委内瑞拉的天然气燃烧问题只是欧佩克成员国利用其大量陆上和海上天然气储备货币化的更大问题的一小部分。来源:Shutterstock.com

委内瑞拉的天然气燃烧问题只是欧佩克成员国利用其大量陆上和海上天然气储备货币化的更大问题的一小部分。

缺乏基础设施可以说是国有石油公司委内瑞拉国家石油公司 (PDVSA) 面临的最大阻力,它与金融和人力资本等其他方面息息相关。

委内瑞拉约 80% 的天然气产量与原油生产有关,根据拉丁美洲天然气能源公司 (Gas Energy Latin America) 的数据,该国预计 2023 年平均燃烧量为 2.1 Bcf/d,低于 2022 年的 2.6 Bcf/d。

因此,这个加勒比国家今年有望通过燃烧损失约 53% 的天然气产量。重要的是,燃烧数据包括通风和泄漏(其中包括甲烷),其本质上主要与燃烧有关。根据 Gas Energy 的数据,将 2023 年的数据与 2020 年至 2022 年的数据汇总后,委内瑞拉的四年平均燃烧率约为 61%。

委内瑞拉最严重的问题从其最基本的形式来看,对金融、经济、环境和健康产生了负面影响——重要性不分先后。

对于委内瑞拉国家石油公司 (PDVSA) 的财务和经济而言,火炬燃烧问题代表着该公司失去了在国内市场获取天然气的巨大机会。也许更重要的是,这失去了在国际上出口天然气和货币化的机会。

但委内瑞拉日益突出的问题对环境和健康方面的影响更深。

天然气含有不同的化合物,但最大的是甲烷,它在排气和泄漏时释放。根据美国环保局 (EPA) 的说法,甲烷作为一种温室气体 (GHG) 的名声确实很差,因为它在大气中吸收热量的能力是 CO 2的 25 倍。

根据美国能源信息署 (EIA) 的数据,火炬燃烧会产生 CO 2、一氧化碳、二氧化硫、氮氧化物和其他化合物,这些化合物仍然对环境有害,但在短期内危害程度低于甲烷。

在环境方面,这不仅对委内瑞拉来说是一团糟,因为温室气体往往不尊重国界。就健康问题而言,爆发的问题同样令人担忧,甚至更令人担忧。委内瑞拉各地的当地社区每天都受到该国燃烧问题的影响,这些问题不仅限于温室气体的释放,还包括与燃烧相关的持续光和噪音。

委内瑞拉的燃眉之急问题可以得到解决,但这需要资金短缺的委内瑞拉国家石油公司进行大量投资。国际石油公司(IOC)可能会介入,但由于美国 2019 年实施的制裁,许多国际石油公司仍与委内瑞拉保持距离。在此之前,国际石油公司必须应对资产征用以及经济和政治的不确定性,其中许多石油公司后两者至今仍然存在。

根据 Worldometer 的数据,委内瑞拉约有 2900 万人口。因此,根据英国石油公司的《能源统计评论》,该国的天然气探明储量估计为 221 Tcf,位居世界第七,相比之下,该国的国内天然气市场相对较小。

尽管委内瑞拉的国内市场可以说是最先受益于火炬燃烧活动减少的市场,但该国的天然气管道基础设施仍然缺乏。许多家庭和小企业仍然与委内瑞拉的天然气网脱节,严重依赖液化石油气。

Gas Energy 估计,只有 7% 的委内瑞拉消费者可以直接使用住宅天然气。相比之下,邻国哥伦比亚的这一比例约为 70%。

直接天然气连接还有助于减少由于物流分配问题或无法在经济上采购液化石油气容器而无法使用液化石油气容器时,公民不得不恢复使用煤炭或木材烹饪所造成的进一步温室气体排放。

委内瑞拉的燃烧问题如果得到解决,也可能有助于增加压缩天然气的供应,并有助于取代内燃机汽车的需求和使用,尽管这会产生相关的转换成本。在委内瑞拉,压缩天然气基本上是免费的,因为其用户通常会向加油站工作人员提供食品并为其压缩机加气。因此,压缩天然气供应量的增加将减轻委内瑞拉国家石油公司生产更多汽油和柴油的压力,而这些汽油和柴油有时并不容易找到,特别是在首都加拉加斯以外的内陆地区。

解决委内瑞拉的突出问题所带来的最大经济影响涉及对邻国特立尼达和多巴哥,甚至欧洲和亚洲的潜在出口。这一选择要求国际奥委会愿意在受到华盛顿制裁的委内瑞拉上下赌注,这是错误棋局的一部分,本以为会带来迅速的政权更迭,但结果却导致超过 700 万委内瑞拉人离开。只要看看美国和墨西哥边境,就能看到美国对委内瑞拉制裁的负面影响。

委内瑞拉的问题正是如此。捕获这些气体可能对解决许多问题大有帮助,但从理论上认识问题到解决问题再到实践则是另一回事了。

原文链接/hartenergy

Venezuela’s Burning Through Gas and Cash

Home to the world’s seventh-largest natural gas reserves, the OPEC member has a massive flaring problem which, if resolved, could allow it to monetize its onshore associated gas production.

Venezuela’s natural gas flaring problem is one small part of a larger problem the OPEC member country has monetizing its massive natural gas reserves both onshore and offshore. (Source: Shutterstock.com)

Venezuela’s natural gas flaring problem is one small part of a larger problem the OPEC member country has monetizing its massive natural gas reserves both onshore and offshore.

A lack of infrastructure is arguably state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela’s (PDVSA) biggest headwind, which ties into others from financial to human capital.

Around 80% of Venezuela’s gas production is associated with the production of crude oil, and the country is expected to flare an average 2.1 Bcf/d in 2023, according to Gas Energy Latin America, down from 2.6 Bcf/d in 2022.

As a result, the Caribbean country is on track this year to lose around 53% of its gas production through flaring. Importantly, the flaring figure includes venting and leakages—which includes methane—but is in essence predominantly related to flaring. When the 2023 data is compiled with data from 2020-2022, Venezuela’s four-year average flaring rate is around 61%, according to data from Gas Energy.

Venezuela’s flaring problem in its most basic form has negative financial, economic, environmental and health impacts—in no particular order of importance.

Financially for PDVSA and economically for Venezuela, the flaring problem represents a massive lost opportunity to capture gas for use in the domestic market. Maybe more importantly, it’s a lost chance to export and monetize the gas internationally.

But Venezuela’s flaring problem hits deeper on the environmental and health side of the equation.

Natural gas contains different compounds, but the largest is methane, which is released during venting and when leakages occur. And methane rightfully has a bad rap as a greenhouse gas (GHG) as it’s 25 times more potent than CO2 in trapping heat in the atmosphere, according to the EPA.

Flaring produces CO2, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and other compounds, which are still bad for the environment but less harmful than methane over the near-term, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).

Environmentally, it’s a mess not only for Venezuela because GHGs don’t tend to respect borders. And in terms of health issues, the flaring problem is just as worrying or more so. Local communities across Venezuela are impacted daily by the country’s flaring problem, which are not just limited to the release of GHGs but also the constant light and noise that is associated with flaring.

Venezuela’s flaring problem could be resolved, but that would require massive investments from a cash-strapped PDVSA. International oil companies (IOCs) could step in but many continue to keep a distance from Venezuela owing to U.S. sanctions imposed in 2019. Prior to that, IOCs had to contend with asset expropriations as well as economic and political uncertainties, of which many of the latter two still exist today.

Venezuela has a population of some 29 million, according to Worldometer. As a result, the country’s domestic gas market is relatively small compared to the country’s estimated proved natural gas reserves of 221 Tcf, the world’s seventh largest, according to BP’s Statistical Review of Energy.

While Venezuela’s domestic market could arguably be the first to benefit from reducing flaring activities, the country’s gas pipeline infrastructure is still lacking. Many households and small businesses remain disconnected from Venezuela’s gas grid and rely heavily on LPG.

Gas Energy estimates that only 7% of Venezuelan consumers have direct residential gas access. This compares to around 70% in neighboring Colombia.

Direct gas hook-ups would also help to reduce further GHG emissions caused by citizens who have to revert to cooking with coal or wood when LPG containers are not available due to logistical distribution issues or an inability to procure them financially.

Venezuela’s flaring problem, if resolved, could also help to boost the supply of CNG and help displace the need and use of internal combustion vehicles, although that has an associated conversion cost. In Venezuela, CNG is basically free, considering that its users usually offer foodstuffs with service station attendants who fill up their compressors. So, the increased availability of CNG would reduce pressures on PDVSA to produce more gasoline and diesel, which at times are not easy to find, especially in interior regions outside the capital city of Caracas.

The biggest economic impact to come from the resolution of Venezuela’s flaring problem relates to potential exports to neighboring Trinidad and Tobago, or beyond to Europe and Asia. That option requires IOCs willing to take a bet on a Venezuela sanctioned by Washington as part of an errant chess move thought to bring about a quick regime change, but has instead led to the departure of more than 7 million Venezuelans. Look no further than the U.S.-Mexico border to see negative impacts from U.S. sanctions on Venezuela.

Venezuela’s flaring problem is just that. Capturing that gas could go a long way toward solving a number of problems, but moving from problem recognition to problem solving in theory and then in practice is another story.