BSEE 发布了 Fieldwood GoM 漏油事件的调查结果

BSEE 发布了 2020 年石油泄漏调查结果,该调查检查了 Fieldwood Energy 在墨西哥湾的作业。

哈特能源员工

美国安全与环境执法局 (BSEE) 确定,在 2020 年的一次漏油事件中,设备故障导致近 500 桶石油损失。3 月 8 日发布的报告发现,Fieldwood Energy 运营的墨西哥湾深水油田因螺柱断裂导致出油管故障。2021 年 9 月摆脱破产保护后,该公司现以 QuarterNorth Energy 名义运营。

该事件于 2020 年 7 月 24 日发生在卡特迈油田 1 号井。该井位于路易斯安那州近海约 140 英里处的 Green Canyon 地区 40 区,水深 2,082 英尺。此次泄漏导致 479 桶石油损失,原因是出油管跨接器发生故障且四个法兰紧固件断裂。

BSEE 专家和专门调查人员进行的调查发现,跳线和法兰故障是螺柱断裂造成的。报道称,这些螺柱由耐腐蚀的镍基合金组成,但该合金在海底环境中容易发生氢脆。造成泄漏的另一个因素是质量保证/质量控制过程中的缺陷,导致不合规的海底法兰紧固件安装。报告称,由于海底警报听不见,而且似乎没有控制室操作员来监控控制室中的海底组件,Fieldwood 的即时海底泄漏检测方法也受到了管线关闭的限制。虽然这些故障不会导致跳线故障,但它们确实影响了故障响应的及时性。

根据调查结果,BSEE 发布了一份安全报告,建议运营商和承包商聘请行业知识丰富的冶金学家来评估所有海底紧固件,以验证其是否适合在海底环境中使用。他们还强调,当发生与设备、人员、操作程序和操作条件相关的修改时,所有公司、合同和分包人员都应制定变更协议的管理。

原文链接/hartenergy

BSEE Releases Investigation Findings from Fieldwood GoM Oil Spill

BSEE released results of a 2020 oil leak investigation that examined Gulf of Mexico operations by Fieldwood Energy.

Hart Energy Staff

The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) determined equipment failure resulted in loss of almost 500 bbl of oil in a 2020 oil spill. The report, released March 8, found that fractured studs resulted in a flowline failure in a Fieldwood Energy-operated deepwater Gulf of Mexico field. Following its emergence from bankruptcy in September 2021, the company now operates as QuarterNorth Energy.

The incident occurred on the Katmai Field Well #1 on July 24, 2020. The well is located approximately 140 miles offshore Louisiana in Green Canyon Area Block 40 in 2,082 ft of water. The leak, which resulted in a loss of 479 barrels of oil, occurred when a flowline jumper failed and four flange fasteners fractured.

The investigation, conducted by BSEE experts and specialized investigators, found that the jumper and flange failures were the result of fractured studs. According to the report, the studs were composed of a corrosion-resistant nickel-based alloy, but the alloy was susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement in subsea environments. Another contributing factor to the leak was a gap in the quality assurance/quality control process that allowed for a non-compliance subsea flange fastener installation. Fieldwood’s methods for immediate subsea leak detection were also found to be limited with the flowline shut-in as there were inaudible subsea alarms, and seemingly no control room operator to monitor subsea components in the control room, according to the report. While these faults did not contribute to the jumper failure, they did impact the timeliness of response to the failure.

As a result of its investigation, BSEE issued a safety report that recommends that operators and contractors use an industry-knowledgeable metallurgist to evaluate all subsea fasteners to verify their suitability for usage in subsea environments. They also emphasize that all company, contract, and sub-contract personnel enact management of change protocol when there are modifications associated with equipment, personnel, operating procedures and operating conditions.