近期，在OPEC+减产的推动下，油价创出今年以来的最高水平。

9 月第一周，沙特阿拉伯和俄罗斯同意将减产维持至年底，合计约为 1.3 MMbbl/d。7月3日沙特宣布自愿减产1万桶/日后，布伦特原油价格从74.65美元/桶上涨至89.92美元/桶（截至9月7日）。

近期石油市场的发展符合我们的预期。我们在 6 月份的文章中指出，OPEC+ 将积极调整供应，以抵消令人失望的经济消息和负面的贸易商情绪。此外，我们预测石油需求将充足，加上供应削减，将导致石油市场出现短缺，因此，油价将呈上升趋势，尽管不是直线上升。

此外，我们提出今年油价不会突破100美元/桶的观点，我们仍然以此为基本预测。

根据我们对第四季度的需求和供应的预测，按照当前的供应趋势（包括沙特阿拉伯和俄罗斯将减产期限延长至年底），我们预计第四季度的赤字将为 1.95 MMbbl/d。即使第四季度出现赤字，全球商业原油库存（经合组织和非经合组织）也将与新冠疫情前的水平基本相同。此外，我们认为，鉴于 OPEC+ 7 月份额外减产后的有效闲置产能接近 6 MMbbl/d，这种水平的赤字不太可能持续。

尽管有减产，但其他国家正在增加产量。此前，我们强调了非洲生产商（包括尼日利亚和利比亚）和受制裁生产商（即委内瑞拉和伊朗）产量的增加。此外，尽管钻机数量一直在减少，但今年美国的产量继续增加。有几个因素导致了这种明显的矛盾。 

与新冠疫情之前相比，二叠纪盆地的产量大幅增加，在美国总产量中所占的份额更大。

• 在二叠纪盆地，尽管钻机数量较少，但每月完井数量已达到新冠疫情前的水平，因为 DUC 井的库存已从 2020 年 7 月的 3,514 口井下降到 2023 年 7 月的 856 口井；
• 二叠纪盆地的钻井活动变得更加高效，每台钻机的井数增加了 19%；  
• 与2019年相比，二叠纪水平井的平均横向长度增加了约15%，而平均支撑剂装载量增加了约7%；和
• 更长的横向长度和增加的支撑剂装载量导致二叠纪井的性能比 2019 年提高了约 15%。

全球经济仍不稳定。尽管美国经济持续增长，但领先指标好坏参半，服务业前景有所改善，制造业萎缩，消费者状况恶化。

然而，美国经济的状况仍然好于欧盟和中国的经济。德国 8 月份工业生产下降 0.8%，全年下降 2.1%，较新冠疫情爆发前下降 7%。中国正在应对疲软的出口市场和疲软的内需，以及负债累累的房地产行业。

其他经济体的疲软正在帮助推高美元，美元指数在 9 月第一周达到今年最高水平就表明了这一点。在其他条件相同的情况下，强势美元会给油价带来下行压力，因为这会导致其他消费国的油价上涨。

在今年剩余时间内，我们预计 OPEC+ 不会进一步削减供应。正如我们之前指出的，供应的最大风险来自地缘政治（和内部冲突），这将导致石油生产和石油运输中断。

目前，我们认为需求不太可能出现意外上升——尤其是在美国，也不是在欧洲。一些人指出中国是需求增加的来源；然而，我们的参考预测已包括中国第四季度近 6% 的需求增长（与 2022 年第四季度相比）。我们认为未来几个月中国的情况不会出现实质性改善——预计出口市场将继续疲软，中国面临的结构性问题也不会通过旨在刺激内需的短期措施得到解决。

Recently, oil prices have reached the highest level seen this year, with supply cuts from OPEC+ providing the impetus.

During the first week of September, Saudi Arabia and Russia agreed to maintain their supply cuts through the end of the year, which combined are around 1.3 MMbbl/d. After Saudi Arabia announced its voluntary production cut of 1 MMbbl/d  on July 3, the price of Brent crude increased from $74.65/bbl to $89.92/bbl (as of Sept. 7).

The recent developments in the oil market have aligned with our expectation. We noted in our June article that OPEC+ would be proactive in adjusting supply to counteract disappointing economic news and negative trader sentiment. Additionally, we forecasted that oil demand would be sufficient, along with the supply cuts, to push the oil market into a deficit and, consequently, the oil price would move forward on an upward trend, albeit not on a straight line.

Furthermore, we put forth the view that oil prices would not break through $100/bbl this year, which we still hold as our base case.

Based on our projected demand and supply for the fourth quarter, we are forecasting that the fourth-quarter deficit will be 1.95 MMbbl/d with the current supply trends (including Saudi Arabia and Russia extending their production cuts through the end of the year). Even if this deficit in the fourth quarter comes to be, global commercial crude inventories (OECD and non-OECD) would be essentially the same as the pre-COVID levels. Additionally, we think it is unlikely that a deficit of this level will be sustainable, given that the effective spare capacity of OPEC+ with the additional production cuts in July is approaching 6 MMbbl/d.

While there have been production cuts, others are increasing their production. Previously, we highlighted increasing production from African producers (including Nigeria and Libya) and sanctioned producers (namely Venezuela and Iran). Additionally, U.S. production continues to increase this year even though the rig count has been decreasing. There are several factors that are resulting in this apparent contradiction. 

Production from the Permian Basin has been increasing significantly and contributing a greater share of overall U.S. production in comparison with the pre-COVID period.

• In the Permian, the monthly completion count has reached pre-COVID levels despite the low rig count because the inventory of DUC wells has declined from 3,514 wells in July 2020 to 856 wells in July 2023;
• Drilling activity in the Permian Basin is becoming more efficient, with wells per rig increasing by 19%;  
• The average lateral length of a horizontal Permian well has increased by around 15% in comparison to 2019, while the average proppant loading has increased by approximately 7%; and
• The longer lateral lengths and the increased proppant loading has resulted in the performance of Permian wells increasing by around 15% compared to their performance in 2019.

The global economy is still shaky. While the U.S. economy continues to grow, the leading indicators are mixed, with the outlook for the service sector showing some improvement, the manufacturing sector contracting and the position of consumers deteriorating.

The U.S. economy, however, remains in better shape than the economies of the EU and China. Germany’s industrial production decreased by 0.8% in August and, for the year, has decreased by 2.1% and is lagging pre-COVID by 7%. China is dealing with weak export markets and weak domestic demand coupled with a debt-laden real estate sector.

The weakness in the other economies is helping to push the U.S. dollar higher, as indicated by the U.S. Dollar Index reaching the highest level this year during the first week of September. All other things being equal, a strong U.S. dollar puts downward pressure on oil prices because it translates into higher oil prices for other consuming countries.

For the remainder of the year, we are not expecting any additional supply cuts from OPEC+. As we previously indicated, the biggest risk to supply stems from geopolitics (and internal conflict) that would result in disruption to oil production and oil movement.

At this point, we think it is unlikely that demand will surprise to the upside—certainly not in the U.S., nor in Europe. Some point to China as source of increased demand; however, our reference forecast already includes demand growth of nearly 6% for China during the fourth quarter (in comparison to fourth-quarter 2022). We do not see the situation improving materially for China during the next few months—the exports markets are expected to remain weak, and the structural issues being faced by China will not be resolved by short-term measures intended to boost domestic demand.