雪佛龙已经是安哥拉石油行业的主要参与者，其市场份额为 26%。然而，这家总部位于美国的石油巨头最近采取了进一步扩大其业务范围的举措。具体来说，该公司在 6 月中旬宣布已签署安哥拉沿海两个许可区域的合同——49 号和 50 号区块，均位于下刚果盆地的超深水区。

就在几年前，这笔交易还不可能实现。

首先，合同的另一方——国家石油、天然气和生物燃料局 (ANPG) 直到 2021 年才成立。当时，由总统若昂·洛伦索领导的安哥拉政府成立了该机构，作为国家石油和天然气特许经营者——即负责谈判石油协议的政府机构，这一角色之前分配给国家石油公司 (NOC) Sonangol。矿产资源和石油部长迪亚曼蒂诺·佩德罗·阿泽维多 (Diamantino Pedro Azevedo) 强调，安哥拉不能在经济增长和环境保护之间做出选择。他制定了能源转型解决方案，改革了能源部门，同时增加了市场确定性并创造了机会。对于能源公司来说，确定性意味着信心，而信心会为安哥拉带来更多投资、更多就业机会和更强劲的增长。

其次，雪佛龙签署的 49 和 50 区块的合同类型直到 2020 年才在安哥拉推出，当时这些合同是安哥拉改革和激励其石油和天然气行业投资计划的一部分，该计划可追溯到 2017 年。

这些风险服务合同 (RSC) 是专门为高风险项目设计的，这些项目预计难以通过通常的渠道获得投资承诺——即竞争性招标程序和签署生产分成协议 (PSA)。根据

RSC，投资者提供勘探和开发服务以换取保证付款。这与 PSA 形成对比，根据 PSA，投资者有权要求获得一定份额的生产，前提是勘探会导致商业开发。

换句话说，安哥拉政府的改革计划使雪佛龙获得 49 和 50 区块的交易成为可能。 （它还促成了其他交易，包括另一家美国巨头埃克森美孚于 2020 年签署的 RSC。）

新前沿
雪佛龙尚未公开其新合同的许多细节。例如，它尚未透露交易的价值。

但是，该公司似乎确实认为这些项目意义重大。正如该公司南部非洲战略业务部董事总经理 William Lacobie 上个月指出的那样，49 和 50 区块代表了雪佛龙子公司卡宾达海湾石油有限公司 (CABGOC) 的新前沿。他指出，到目前为止，CABGOC 一直专注于 0 和 14 区块，这两个区块都位于安哥拉近海区域已充分勘探的区域。他说，49 和 50 区块将是“ABGOC 在现有卡宾达特许权区之外的首批运营资产”。

但雪佛龙并非唯一受益方。安哥拉也将从新合同中获益，这将为国民经济增添价值。这种价值部分来自投资，部分来自获得勘探（并可能开发）超深水区块所需的先进新技术。

改革的标志
然而，好处并不仅限于金钱和技术。49 号和 50 号区块的 RSC 还表明，迪亚曼蒂诺·佩德罗·阿泽维多推动的改革正在为石油和天然气行业开辟新的机会。

让我来解释一下。RSC

对雪佛龙很有吸引力，因为它们为公司提供了赚钱的机会，尽管 49 号和 50 号区块位于近海区域的超深水部分。这些地区尚未完全勘探，而且缺乏支持美国石油巨头在 0 号和 14 号区块上游业务的广泛生产基础设施。换句话说，新合同使该公司能够进入边境省份并扩大其在安哥拉的业务范围，而不会承担太大风险。同时

，这些交易也使该国受益，因为它们将把雪佛龙的专业知识、设备和技术带到这些超深水地点，希望这能成为其他国际石油公司 (IOC) 进一步投资该地区的前奏。这不是安哥拉可以通过其他方式实现的目标，因为 Sonangol 不具备独自勘探和开发这些区块所需的资源，而竞争性招标程序可能无法吸引其他投资者。

埃克森美孚签署的 30、44 和 45 号区块交易也是如此。如果没有 RSC，这些位于另一个边境省份纳米贝盆地内的区块可能永远无法获得投资承诺。

其他更好的变化
除了 RSC 之外，自 2017 年以来，安哥拉还做出了许多其他改变，以鼓励国际石油公司在该国开展业务。

例如，它制定了对 Sonangol 进行部分私有化的计划。NOC 以前更像是政府的一个部门，而不是石油公司，它是所有潜在合作伙伴的主要联络点，执行行业法律法规，并根据罗安达官员的要求运营多家非核心子公司。不过现在，它已经剥离了许多子公司，并正准备在本地和国际交易所进行首次公开​​募股。

与此同时，安哥拉当局还建立了一个永久性的报价计划，允许安哥拉国家石油公司通过直接与国际石油公司就某些项目进行谈判，而不是进行竞争性招标，来加快签订合同的速度。此外，它还修改了税法，为石油行业的投资者提供额外的激励，并改革了本地内容政策，旨在帮助国际石油公司与当地承包商合作。

此外，安哥拉还采取措施，以非直接的方式协助石油和天然气行业。例如，它现在允许 98 个国家的公民免签证访问安哥拉，而之前只有 62 个国家。这项措施表面上是为了促进旅游业，但也有望使国际石油公司受益，因为名单上的一些新成员是拥有世界上最大的石油和天然气运营商的国家，例如美国、英国、韩国、日本和印度。

总而言之，这些措施似乎帮助安哥拉度过了 2020 年的冠状病毒 (COVID-19) 大流行以及随后几年扰乱全球能源市场的其他事件。这些举措还使该国能够吸引新项目的投资。这些项目包括卡宾达和洛比托炼油厂的建设，以及每年向意大利出口 15 亿立方米液化天然气 (LNG) 的交易。

需要进一步改革
即便如此，安哥拉还有更多工作要做。改革必须继续。

尽管目前取得了进展，但安哥拉政府尚未推进出售 Sonangol 高达 30% 股份的计划。政府已将该公司首次公开募股的最后期限定为 2026 年，但政府还表示，只有在采取某些措施将 NOC 打造成一家垂直整合的石油和天然气公司，拥有大量上游业务和更多满足国内燃料需求的能力后，才会继续推进，正如 AEC 在 2023 年 7 月更详细地讨论的那样。

展望未来，政府需要确保这些措施不会失败。

如果罗安达不采取这些措施并实施进一步改革，它就有可能失去已经取得的一些成果。它将更难阻止原油产量的长期下降，提高天然气产量，吸引资金用于为当地市场提供更清洁燃料的炼油和石化项目，并为最终向可再生能源转型奠定基础。

因此，它必须努力使国家更具竞争力、更有利于商业发展和更透明。它应该打击腐败，加强对主权财富基金的监督，该基金负责管理国家从石油和天然气销售中获得的收益。它应该与投资者合作，寻找最大化本地内容的方法，并应该考虑为国际石油公司提供额外的税收减免。

此外，它应该通过鼓励液化石油气 (LPG) 的消费，为该国的天然气生产建立国内价值链。这将使更多的安哥拉人能够获得清洁燃料，并逐步淘汰导致森林砍伐的生物燃料，如木炭和木材。

的确，由于洛伦索政府实施的改革，安哥拉的石油和天然气行业自 2017 年以来取得了进展。但随着雪佛龙签署新的 RSC，改革进程不应止步于此。它应该继续前进，这样这个国家才有更好的机会迈向更光明的未来。

Chevron is already a major player in Angola’s oil sector, where it holds a market share of 26%. However, the U.S.-based major recently took a step that promises to expand its footprint further. Specifically, it announced in mid-June that it had signed contracts for two license areas off the coast of Angola – Blocks 49 and 50, both located in an ultra-deepwater section of the Lower Congo Basin.

Just a few years ago, this deal wouldn’t have been possible.

First, the other party to the contracts — the National Oil, Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANPG) — didn’t even come into existence until 2021. That’s when the Angolan government, led by President João Lourenço, created the agency to serve as the state oil and gas concessionaire — that is, the government body responsible for negotiating petroleum agreements, a role previously assigned to the national oil company (NOC) Sonangol. Diamantino Pedro Azevedo, Minister of Mineral Resources and Petroleum has made it a point that Angola must not choose between economic growth and environmental protection. He crafted solutions to energy transition, reforming the energy sector, while simultaneously increasing market certainties and creating opportunities. For the energy companies, certainty translates into confidence, and confidence leads to more investment, more jobs and more robust growth for Angola.

Second, the type of contracts Chevron signed for Blocks 49 and 50 wasn’t available in Angola until 2020, when they were launched as part of the Angolan plan to reform and incentive investment in its oil and gas industry, an initiative that dates to 2017.

These risk service contracts (RSC), as they’re known, are designed specifically for high-risk projects that are anticipated to have trouble securing investment commitments through the usual channels — that is, competitive bidding processes and the signing of production-sharing agreements (PSA).

Under RSCs, investors provide exploration and development services in exchange for guaranteed payments. This is in contrast to PSAs, under which investors are entitled to claim a share of production, assuming that exploration leads to commercial development.

In other words, the Angolan government’s reform program made Chevron’s deal for Blocks 49 and 50 possible. (It has also made other deals possible, including the RSCs signed in 2020 by ExxonMobil, another U.S.-based giant.)

A New Frontier
Chevron has not yet made many details of its new contracts public. It has not, for instance, revealed the value of the deals.

However, the company certainly seems to view these projects as significant. As William Lacobie, the managing director of the company’s Southern Africa Strategic Business Unit, pointed out last month, Blocks 49 and 50 represent a new frontier for Chevron subsidiary Cabinda Gulf Oil Co. Ltd (CABGOC). Thus far, he noted, CABGOC has focused on Blocks 0 and 14, both located in well-explored sections of the Angolan offshore zone. Blocks 49 and 50 will be “CABGOC’s first operated assets outside of our existing Cabinda concession area,” he said.

But Chevron will not be the only party to benefit. Angola also stands to gain from the new contracts, which will add value to the national economy. This value will come partly in the form of investment and partly in access to the sophisticated new technologies needed to explore (and possibly develop) the ultra-deepwater blocks.

A Sign of Reform
The benefits aren’t limited to money and technology, however. The RSCs for Blocks 49 and 50 also show that the reforms driven by Diamantino Pedro Azevedo are opening up new opportunities for the oil and gas industry.

Let me explain.

The RSCs are attractive to Chevron because they give the company an opportunity to earn money even though Blocks 49 and 50 lie within the ultra-deepwater section of the offshore zone. These areas have yet to be fully explored, and they lack the extensive production infrastructure that supports the U.S. major’s upstream operations at Blocks 0 and 14. In other words, the new contracts allow the company to enter a frontier province and expand its footprint in Angola without incurring too much risk.

At the same time, the deals benefit the country, as they will bring Chevron’s expertise, equipment, and technology to these ultra-deepwater sites, hopefully as a prelude to further investment in the area by other international oil companies (IOCs). This is not something Angola could have accomplished in other ways, as Sonangol does not have the resources needed to explore and develop the blocks on its own, and a competitive bidding process might have failed to attract other investors.

The same is true of ExxonMobil’s deals for Blocks 30, 44, and 45. Without RSCs, these sites, all of which are located within another frontier province known as the Namibe Basin, might never have been able to secure investment commitments.

Other Changes for The Better
The availability of RSCs aside, Angola has made a number of other changes since 2017 in a bid to encourage IOCs to do business there.

For example, it has formulated plans for partial privatization of Sonangol. The NOC had previously functioned more as an arm of the government than as an oil company, serving as the main point of contact for all potential partners, enforcing industry laws and regulations, and operating multiple non-core subsidiaries at the behest of officials in Luanda. Now, though, it has hived off many of its daughter companies and is preparing for an initial public offering on local and international exchanges.

Meanwhile, Angolan authorities have also established a permanent offer scheme that allows ANPG to accelerate the pace of signing contracts by negotiating directly with IOCs on certain projects rather than carrying out competitive bidding rounds. Additionally, it has revised the tax code to offer additional incentives to investors in the petroleum sector and has reformed local content policies in ways that are designed to help IOCs work with local contractors.

Moreover, Angola has taken steps to assist the oil and gas sector less directly. For example, it now permits citizens of 98 countries to visit Angola without a visa, up from 62 previously. This measure was ostensibly designed to facilitate tourism, but it also promises to benefit IOCs since some of the new entries on the list are countries that host the world’s biggest oil and gas operators, such as the U.S., the UK, South Korea, Japan, and India.

Altogether, these measures seem to have helped Angola weather the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020 and other events that disrupted global energy markets in subsequent years. They have also allowed the country to attract investments for new projects. These include deals for construction of the Cabinda and Lobito refineries and for the expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Italy by 1.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year.

More Reform Needed
Even so, Angola has more work to do. Reform must continue.

Despite the progress made so far, Angola’s government has yet to proceed with plans to sell up to 30% of Sonangol. It has set a deadline of 2026 for the company’s IPO, but it has also said it will only move forward after taking certain steps to establish the NOC as a vertically integrated oil and gas company that has a substantial upstream footprint and more capacity to meet domestic fuel demand, as the AEC discussed in greater detail in July 2023.

Moving forward, the government will need to ensure that these steps do not falter.

If Luanda fails to take these steps and enact further reforms, it risks losing some of the ground it has gained. It will have a harder time staving off a long-term decline in crude oil output, boosting natural gas production, attracting funding for refining and petrochemical projects that can supply the local market with cleaner fuels, and laying the groundwork for its eventual transition to renewable energy.

Therefore, it must work to make the country more competitive, more business-friendly, and more transparent. It should clamp down on corruption and improve oversight of its sovereign wealth fund, which handles the state’s earnings from oil and gas sales. It ought to team up with investors to look for ways to maximize local content, and it should consider additional tax breaks for IOCs.

Moreover, it should establish a domestic value chain for the country’s natural gas production by encouraging consumption of liquid petroleum gas (LPG). This would allow many more Angolans to gain access to clean-burning fuels and phase out the use of biofuels that contribute to deforestation such as charcoal and wood.

It’s true that Angola’s oil and gas sector has made progress since 2017, thanks to the reforms enacted by the Lourenço administration. But the reform process should not stop here, with the signing of Chevron’s new RSCs. It should move forward so that the country has a better chance to aim for a brighter future.