整合难题

整合能否帮助刺激公司克服长期供应过剩的问题?

  • 刺激提供者面临着整合的压力。

  • 设备太多,需求太少。

18 个月内的三笔交易以及华尔街的传言正在加剧人们对压力泵行业下一个整合周期的预期。

当前周期始于斯伦贝谢有限公司于 2018 年 1 月以 4.3 亿美元收购 Weatherford International 在美国的 100 万液压马力 (hhp)压力泵资产。接下来,总部位于米德兰的压力泵制造商ProPetro 在 2018 年第四季度以 4 亿美元的股票和现金收购了 Pioneer Natural Resources Co. 的八个差压泵部门和 510,000 hhp。然后,今年 6 月,C&J Energy Services Inc . 和 Keane Group Inc. 宣布进行 7.455 亿美元的全股票合并,创建拥有 50 个价差和 230 万马力的国内第三大增产船队(交易计划于今年年底完成)。总共三笔交易,总价 15 亿美元,马力 200 万。

最后,资本市场上对 Patterson UTI Energy 的 150 万马力 Universal Well Services 增产部门的潜在撤资存在争议,并猜测 Superior Energy Services 和 FTS International 是收购目标。


 
报名参加2019 年 11 月 5 日至 6 日在德克萨斯州米德兰举行的高管石油会议暨展览会,聆听来自 Wolfcamp、Bone Spring、Avalon、Dean、Jo Mill、Spraberry、Clearfork 和 San Andres 的 30 多位高管级演讲者的演讲 。

与此同时,油井增产公司的工作正在变得越来越好、越来越高效,基本上随着价格的下跌而从利润中获利。这就引出了一个问题:整合将如何使刺激行业受益。该行业在降低油井成本和提高性能方面完成了自耕农的工作,这抵消了整合有望消除的总管理费用。更大的效率提升即将到来。

问题是设备太多,无法满足日益萎缩的需求。那么为什么要购买注定要堆叠的设备呢?报废设备并不能证明上市压力泵交易的财务状况是合理的。在 20 世纪 90 年代末进行陆地钻探整合之后,遗留设备仍然留在账簿上,尽管它们已经生锈了十多年,最终被认为具有股东价值的资产被减记。

油井增产领域已经反映了陆地钻探领域的情况,其中五个公共实体占据了 50% 的市场份额,其余的则争夺不断缩小的蛋糕的剩余部分。继C&J/Keane之后,油井增产领域将包括四家拥有超过200万马力的公司,合计占该行业产能的50%以上,以及二级公司的产能分布范围为100万至200万马力。基本上,9家企业代表了80%以上的刺激能力。

三个因素支持变革。一是勘探生产自采的商业模式,取消了以前提供从摇篮到坟墓的井场服务的服务公司提供的增值服务,通过价值的多级复利,以微利的方式挤进低利润的行业。链。少数仅向大型自采购勘探与生产公司出租液压马力的压力泵公司发现,在长期供过于求的压力泵市场中,这种商业模式在经济上具有挑战性,因此它们本身就是整合的候选者。

第二个因素是技术变革。有趣的是,ProPetro 在收购 Pioneer 的机械压力泵部门后宣布了增量电动车队的订单。ProPetro 购买的是“十年的工作量”和“劳动力”,而不是资产。然而,技术变革即将到来;在拥有 365 个活跃价差的行业中,电刺激船队的订单仅占市场份额的不到 4%。最后,该行业正经历资金短缺,关闭了小型压力泵公司的增长途径。

行业经济鼓励整合,特别是当勘探与生产公司在行业外部的财务压力下减少支出时。从短期来看,整合问题必须克服整合经济性抵消资产消耗不平衡的买卖差价的障碍。

原文链接/hartenergy

The Consolidation Conundrum

Will consolidation help stimulation firms overcome chronic oversupply?

  • Stimulation providers face pressure to consolidate.

  • There is too much equipment and too little demand.

Three transactions in 18 months, and Wall Street rumors, are fueling expectations for the next consolidation cycle among pressure pumpers.

The current cycle started when Schlumberger Ltd. acquired Weatherford International’s 1 million hydraulic horsepower (hhp) in U.S. pressure pumping assets in January 2018 for $430 million. Next, Midland-based pressure pumper ProPetro bought Pioneer Natural Resources Co.’s eight spread pressure pumping division and 510,000 hhp for $400 million in stock and cash in the fourth quarter of 2018. Then, in June of this year, C&J Energy Services Inc. and Keane Group Inc. announced a $745.5 million all-stock merger creating the third largest domestic stimulation fleet with 50 spreads and 2.3 million hhp (the transaction is scheduled to close by the end of the year). In all, three deals, $1.5 billion in consideration and 2 million hhp.

Finally, there is banter in the capital markets about a potential divestment of Patterson UTI Energy’s 1.5-million-hhp Universal Well Services stimulation division, along with speculation that Superior Energy Services and FTS International are acquisition targets.


 

Meanwhile, well stimulation companies are getting better and more efficient at what they do, essentially working themselves out of a profit as pricing deflates. And that begs the question as to how consolidation will benefit the stimulation sector. The sector has done yeoman’s work in reducing well cost and improving performance, which has offset the aggregate overhead that consolidation promises to eliminate. Greater efficiency improvements are on the way.

The problem is too much equipment for shrinking demand. So why buy equipment destined to stack out? Scrapping equipment won’t justify the financials on the deal for publicly held pressure pumpers. Following the land drilling consolidation in the late 1990s, legacy equipment remained on the books even as it rusted for more than a decade before the eventual write-down of assets once considered to have shareholder value.

The well stimulation sector already reflects the land drilling sector where five public entities represent 50% of the market and the rest fight for the remaining portions of a shrinking pie. Post C&J/ Keane, the well stimulation sector will feature four firms with more than 2 million hhp that collectively account for more than 50% of the sector’s capacity and a secondary tier of companies in the 1 million to 2 million hhp spread range. Basically, nine firms represent more than 80% of stimulation capacity.

Three factors argue for change. One is the business model where E&P self-sourcing eliminates value-added services provided by service companies that formerly delivered cradle-to-grave wellsite service, squeezing out a living in a low-margin business by compounding small profits from multiple steps in the value chain. The handful of pressure pumpers that rent hydraulic horsepower only to large self-sourcing E&P companies are finding that business model to be economically challenging in a chronically oversupplied pressure pumping market and are themselves candidates for consolidation.

A second factor is technological change. Interesting to note that ProPetro announced orders for incremental electric fleets after acquiring Pioneer’s mechanical pressure pumping division. ProPetro bought a decade’s worth of work—and the labor—rather than the assets. Technological change is coming though; orders for electric stimulation fleets represent less than 4% of market share in an industry with 365 active spreads. Finally, the industry is undergoing a drought in capital, closing off avenues for growth among smaller pressure pumping firms.

Industry economics encourage consolidation, especially as E&P companies spend less under financial pressures external to the industry. Shorter term, the consolidation question must overcome the hurdle whereby the economics of consolidation offset an unbalanced bid-ask spread for depleting assets.