皮茨:超级大联盟编织了一张多么错综复杂的网

埃克森美孚、雪佛龙、圭亚那和委内瑞拉“达成协议”符合“南美风格”。

埃克森美孚雪佛龙这两家主导北美能源领域的超级巨头,目前正在争夺南美市场。  (来源:Shutterstock)

埃克森美孚雪佛龙是北美能源领域的两大巨头,如今正在争夺南美市场。

两家公司正在就圭亚那海域丰富的圭亚那-苏里南盆地投资组合变更机会寻求仲裁。解决方案可能在今年晚些时候公布。

圭亚那近海的斯塔布鲁克区块是埃克森美孚最有前景的资产。埃克森美孚(45% 的股权)领导一个财团,其中包括赫斯公司(30%)和中国海洋石油总公司(25%)。勘探工作于 2015 年开始,并于 2019 年 12 月开采出第一批石油。

到目前为止,这些公司已经在斯塔布鲁克发现了超过 110 亿桶油当量的可采资源。到 2027 年,六个开发项目将使用六艘 FPSO,预计产量将达到 130 万桶/天。开发资源基础可能需要多达 10 艘 FPSO。

但埃克森在圭亚那的经营并非一帆风顺。埃克森在早期被指控与前政府达成私下协议,而前政府在谈判石油合同方面毫无经验。后来,与燃烧相关的问题引起了更多负面关注。

现在的问题是斯塔布鲁克。

雪佛龙于 2023 年 10 月宣布以 530 亿美元收购赫斯,这是过去 12 个月美国公司之间的第二大交易。这笔交易涉及巴肯页岩的资产,但也为该公司在圭亚那提供了立足点。由于埃克森美孚和中海油都声称对赫斯在圭亚那的权益拥有优先购买权,因此此次收购被推迟。赫斯股东于 5 月底批准了这笔交易。

埃克森美孚和雪佛龙与南美国家政府的关系一直爱恨交织。阿根廷、巴西、厄瓜多尔和圭亚那都是如此。最近的例子是圭亚那隔壁的委内瑞拉,这涉及到美国公司与华盛顿之间的明显联系。

在爱情方面,委内瑞拉总统尼科尔·马杜罗政府视雪佛龙为宠儿。由于多年来石油租金管理不善和美国制裁的沉重压力,资金短缺的PDVSA未能将产量恢复到 1997 年的 320 万桶/天左右。

但根据 OPEC 的数据,石油产量已从新冠疫情期间的低点回升至 2024 年第一季度的平均 817,000 桶/日,这在很大程度上归功于所谓的“雪佛龙效应”。 

美国对委内瑞拉的限制并不适用于雪佛龙,雪佛龙拥有美国外国资产控制办公室(OFAC)颁发的特别许可证,允许该公司在委内瑞拉运营。

从仇恨角度来看,埃克森美孚可能是有史以来在委内瑞拉运营的最受鄙视的国际石油公司。 

原因之一是埃克森美孚在 21 世纪初将其错误资产征用案件提交国际仲裁。 

第二个原因是,马杜罗政府认为委内瑞拉支持圭亚那对埃塞奎博地区的主权,而不支持委内瑞拉。

埃克森和雪佛龙真的能在圭亚那结下爱情之缘吗?雪佛龙在圭亚那的存在能否缓解圭亚那和委内瑞拉之间的紧张关系?

剧情还在继续展开。

原文链接/HartEnergy

Pitts: Oh, What a Tangled Web the Supermajors Weave

Exxon and Chevron and Guyana and Venezuela—‘Let’s Make A Deal’ meets ‘Love, South American Style.’

Exxon Mobil and Chevron, supermajors dominating the North American energy space, are now jostling for South America. (Source: Shutterstock)

Exxon Mobil and Chevron, supermajors dominating the North American energy space, are now jostling for South America.

The two are pursuing arbitration over a portfolio-changing opportunity offshore Guyana in the prolific Guyana-Suriname Basin. A resolution could come later this year.

The Stabroek Block offshore Guyana is Exxon’s most promising asset. There, Exxon (45% interest) leads a consortium that includes Hess Corp. (30%) and China National Offshore Oil Corp., or CNOOC (25%). Exploration started in 2015 and first oil was reached in December 2019.

So far, the companies have found recoverable resources in Stabroek of over 11 Bboe. Production is expected to reach 1.3 MMbbl/d by 2027 from six developments that will utilize six FPSOs. As many as 10 FPSOs may be needed to develop the resource base.

But Exxon’s tenure in Guyana hasn’t been without issues. In its early days, Exxon was accused of striking a sweetheart deal with the prior government, which had zero experience negotiating oil contracts. Later, issues related to flaring drew more negative attention.

Now, the issue is Stabroek.

Chevron’s $53 billion purchase of Hess, announced in October 2023, is the second-largest deal among U.S. companies in the last 12 months. The deal involves assets in the Bakken Shale, but also gives the company a foothold in Guyana. The purchase has been delayed because Exxon and CNOOC both claim right of first refusal on Hess’ interest in Guyana. Hess shareholders approved the deal in late May.

Exxon and Chevron have endured a love-hate relationship with South American governments. That’s been true in Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, as well as Guyana. The most recent example is next door to Guyana, in Venezuela, and involves perceived links between the American companies and Washington.

On the love side, the government of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro views Chevron as a darling. Cash-strapped PDVSA hasn’t been able to return production to the 3.2 MMbbl/d range seen in 1997, owing to years of oil rents mismanagement and the heavy weight of U.S. sanctions.

But production has risen from lows during the COVID-19 pandemic to average 817,000 bbl/d in first-quarter 2024, according to OPEC, in great part due to the so-called “efecto Chevron,” or Chevron effect. 

U.S. restrictions on Venezuela don’t apply to Chevron, which has a special license issued by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) that allows the company to operate there.

On the hate side, Exxon may be the most despised international oil company to have ever operated in Venezuela. 

One reason is that Exxon took its wrongful asset expropriation cases in the mid-2000s to international arbitration. 

The second reason is that the Maduro government perceives the supermajor as backing Guyana’s claim to the Essequibo region over Venezuela’s.

Can Exxon and Chevron really make a love connection in Guyana? Will Chevron’s presence in Guyana ease tensions between Guyana and Venezuela?

The drama continues to unfold.