2024 年 7 月

钻探进展及其发展方向

当谈到随着活动增加而出现绩效倒退时,推进钻探的一种方法是找到更好、更可靠的方法来确保我们将已有的专业知识和技能传授给新工人和新团队。
Ford Brett,PE/特约编辑

继续我在上一篇专栏文章中开始讲述的故事,我们将简要介绍一下美国的钻井活动,看看过去 25 年来钻井业绩发生了怎样的变化,以及我们如何才能取得更大的进步。(如果您对完整的故事感兴趣,请参阅我上一篇专栏文章:专栏——钻井进展 (Brett) (nxtbook.com)

图 1显示了美国钻井历史上的一个重要关系:活跃钻机数和平均每日英尺数。钻井的这两个指标(活跃度和生产率)提出了一些有趣的问题:

  • 每当活跃钻井平台大幅增加时,每天的产量就会下降,为什么呢?
  • 每当活跃钻井平台大规模下沉时,每天的产量就会上升,为什么呢?
  • 直到 2012 年左右,每天的平均英尺数都相当平稳,然后飙升了约 240%,从 2012 年到 2023 年,每年增加 10%,为什么?
图 1. 美国活跃钻井数量和平均每日英尺数。

在我们开始(尝试)解决这些问题之前,让我们先收集更多事实。

事实:油井越来越深,越来越复杂。美国的平均油井深度每年只略有增加,直到 2008 年才开始增长,从平均深度 6,000 英尺增加到 14,500 英尺(1.8 公里到 4.4 公里),增长了约 265%(每年 5.8%),图 2

图 2. 1998 年至 2023 年美国平均井深。

为国际读者提供简短的介绍:非常规入门。美国钻井人员知道这一点,但对于一些国际读者来说,这可能是新闻:由于非常规水平井的比例越来越大,并且这些井的水平段越来越长,2010 年代平均井深增加。粗略地说,美国非常规目标区始于约 8,000 英尺(2.4 公里)的真实垂直深度。水平段始于约 5,000 英尺(1.5 公里),现在非常常见的是 10,000 英尺(3 公里)的水平段,截至撰写本文时,许多水平段接近 15,000 英尺(4.5 公里)。因此,早期非常规井的总深度约为 13,000 英尺(4 公里),现在通常超过 20,000 英尺(6 公里)。 (至少在美国,将这些称为“非常规”井有点可笑,因为在美国,它们现在非常常见;垂直井或仅仅是定向井才是奇怪的。)

图 1图 2显示了评估钻井绩效的几种方法:钻井类型(例如深度)以及这些井的生产效率(英尺/天)。通过这些措施,钻井确实取得了很大进步。在未来的专栏中,我们将探讨造成这种情况的原因以及这对如何继续前进意味着什么。但事情并非一帆风顺。

美中不足的是:我们对活动变化的反应方式。当我们退后一步仔细观察时,会发现钻井技术已经取得了很大进步。与 10 年前相比,我们能够更高效地钻出更复杂的井。但我们至少有一个改进的机会:我们如何应对活动变化。图 1显示,每当活动增加时,性能就会下降。图 3显示了更精确的观察方法

图 3显示了同比绩效(以平均每日英尺的百分比变化来衡量)随钻井数量百分比变化的变化情况。这是图 1中绩效/活动跳格和锯齿状图的数学关系。  图 3显示了这样一个数学事实:钻井数量增加时钻井工人的表现会变差,而减少时钻井工人的表现会变好。该方程显示,平均绩效同比增长 5.4%(方程中的 + 0.054)——这很好。但是,随着活动范围的扩大,我们在重复我们已经知道如何做的事情方面做得并不好(根本做不到)。该图还显示,过去 10 年的表现与之前 15 年的表现非常相似(三角形看起来像 X),因此,虽然我们正在变得更好,但我们在处理活动变化方面做得并不好。这让我们付出了很大的代价;未来的专栏将会表明,消除这种影响对于推进钻探来说并不是一个微不足道的机会。

图 3. 性能变化与活动变化。

最后一点:安全性也会随着活动的变化而变化。图 4显示了另一种测量钻井性能的方法,但这种方法的效果并不好。

图 4. 美国石油和天然气开采死亡率的变化与钻井数量的变化。

按照规范和高效地钻孔并不是衡量钻井绩效的唯一标准;我们需要负责任地进行钻井。我们在钻井时不能伤害他人(或世界)。我们所做的一切都让世界变得更美好,因为我们提供能源,让生活变得更轻松、更美好(关于这一点的重要性,以后的文章会详细介绍)。但如果我们在钻井过程中伤害了他人,那我们就没有让事情变得更好。我记得当迈克·哈里斯(当时担任阿帕奇钻井负责人)告诉我,“钻井工人可以安全地完成他们需要做的一切工作;钻井没有理由不应该像坐在家里的客厅里一样安全。”每个人都完全有可能下班回家时比上班时感觉更好:通过出色完成工作、没有受伤或没有把世界搞得一团糟而获得报酬,从而变得更加富有。

图 4与图 3类似,只是其绩效不是以平均每天英尺数来衡量,而是以石油和天然气开采工人的死亡率来衡量。(注意:这些死亡人数是所有石油和天然气开采活动的死亡人数,而不仅仅是钻井活动)。这个数字令人难过。钻井活动增加时,死亡率也会上升。活动越多,从逻辑上讲意味着更多的人处于危险之中,不幸的是,受伤的人也越多。这个图表并没有显示这一点。它表明我们越忙,死亡率就越高不仅工人越多,而且他们受伤的频率也更高。

有一线希望;我们平均而言正在变得更好。死亡率确实平均每年下降 1.4% (回归中的“-.014”)。但是当活动量增加 X% 时,死亡率就会上升 0.65*X%。随着我们越来越忙,我们的安全感也越来越差。这里可能还有另一个希望的理由,因为看起来我们最近有所好转;2017 年,活动量增加了 70%,死亡率“仅”增加了 25%。然而,这仍然是我们想要(和需要)达到的水平。即便如此,当我们变得更忙时,我们的效率和安全表现会更差。

这意味着什么?我们有很大机会通过转移能力来取得进步。在上一篇专栏文章中,我介绍了三件我确信与钻井进步有关的事情:

技术:改进的井下工具和地面设备将技术极限向前推进。

人员:当您释放钻机时,学习曲线优化和提升需要更多时间,而当您将他们带回来时,工作人员需要“电子学习”。

流程:我们合作方式的演变以及旨在实现卓越运营的应不应做的事情帮助我们消除损失和浪费。

当工作量增加导致绩效下降时,推进钻井的一种方法是找到更好、更可靠的方法,确保我们将已有的专业知识和技能传授给新工人和新团队。我们不需要发明新的东西;我们只需要尽我们已知的方法和已经证明的我们能够做到的去做就行了。人们尝试这样做的一种方法是采用“批量资源管理”原则(下一篇专栏将对此进行详细介绍)。

与此同时,我希望与你们中的任何人展开对话,讨论我们如何共同帮助 Drilling Advance。请给我发送电子邮件,地址是ford.brett@petroskills.com,我保证会回复。

关于作者
福特布雷特,PE
特约编辑
Ford Brett,PE,是 PetroSkills 的首席执行官。他曾在 45 多个国家提供咨询服务,获得 35 多项专利,撰写了 40 多项技术出版物,并担任 SPE 杰出讲师,以及 SPE 董事会钻井和完井技术总监。
相关文章
原文链接/WorldOil
July 2024
Columns

Drilling advances and where they’re headed

When it comes to performance regressing as activity increases, one way to advance drilling is to find better and more reliable ways to ensure that we transfer the know-how and skills we already have to new workers and new teams.
Ford Brett, P.E. / Contributing Editor

Continuing with the story we started in my last column, we’re looking briefly at U.S. drilling activity, to see how drilling performance has changed over the last 25 years and how we can advance even further. (Refer to my last column, if you are interested in the complete story: Column—Drilling Advances (Brett) (nxtbook.com))

Figure 1 shows one important relationship from the history of drilling in the U.S.: Active Rigs and Average Feet per Day.  These two measures of drilling—activity and productivity—raise some interesting questions:

  • Every time active rigs go up in a big way, feet per day go down—why?
  • Every time active rigs go down in a big way, feet per day go up—why?
  • Average feet per day was pretty flat until about 2012, then it rocketed up by some 240%, a 10% increase per year from 2012 to 2023—why?
Fig. 1. U.S. active rigs and average feet per day.

Let’s assemble a few more facts before we start (trying to) address these questions.

Fact: wells are deeper and more complex. Average well depth in the U.S. was only increasing slightly each year until 2008, when it started taking off, growing by some 265% (5.8% per year) from an average depth of 6,000 ft to 14,500 ft (1.8 km to 4.4 km), Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Average well depth, U.S., 1998–2023.

A short detour for international readers: an unconventional primer. U.S. drillers know this, but for some international readers this may be news: average well depth increased through the 2010s because of an increasingly larger percentage of unconventional horizontal wells, and those wells had increasingly longer laterals. Very roughly, U.S. unconventional zones of interest started at a true vertical depth of ~8,000 ft (2.4 km). Laterals started out at about 5,000 ft (1.5 km) and are now very routinely 10,000-ft (3 km) laterals, with many approaching 15,000 ft (4.5 km) as of writing. So, early unconventional wells were about 13,000 ft (4 km) and are now often over 20,000 ft (6 km) in total depth. (In the U.S. at least, it’s kind of funny to call these “unconventional” wells, because in the U.S. they are now very normal; vertical or merely directional wells are what is odd.)

Figure 1 and Fig. 2 show a couple of ways to assess drilling’s performance: the kind of wells delivered (e.g. how deep) and how efficiently those wells were produced (feet per day). Drilling did advance a lot by these measures. In future columns, we’ll get into what caused this and what it means about how to keep advancing. But everything isn’t peaches and cream.

One fly in the ointment: the way we respond to changes in activity. When we are standing back and squinting at it, drilling has advanced a lot. We deliver more complicated wells much more efficiently than we did 10 years ago. But we do have at least one opportunity to get better: how we respond to changes in activity. Figure 1 shows that every time activity goes up, performance goes down. A way to look at this more precisely is shown in Fig. 3.

Figure 3 shows a plot of how year-over-year performance (as measured by percentage change in average feet per day) changes with percent change in rig count. This is the mathematical relationship of the performance/activity jigs and jags in Fig. 1.  Figure 3 shows that it’s a mathematical fact that drillers do worse when rig count goes up, and better when it goes down. The equation shows that average performance is up year over year by 5.4% (the + 0.054 in the equation)—that’s good. But we do not do a very good job (at all) of repeating what we already know how do to, as we expand activity.  The plot also shows that the last 10 years behave pretty much like the prior 15 (the triangles look like the X’s), so while we are getting better, we don’t do well at handling changes in activity. This costs us a lot; future columns will show that eliminating this effect is not a trivial opportunity to advance drilling.

Fig. 3. Change in performance vs change in activity.

One last fact: safety varies with changes in activity, too. Figure 4 shows another way to measure drilling performance, and that doesn’t tell quite as good a story.

Fig. 4. Change in U.S. oil and gas extraction fatality rate vs change in rig count.

Making holes to specification and doing it efficiently are not the only measures of drilling performance; we need to do it responsibly. We can’t hurt people (or the world) when we do it. What we do makes the world a better place, by providing energy to make lives easier and better (more on how important this is in future articles). But if we hurt people in the process, we are not making things better.  I remember when Mike Harris—then head of Apache’s drilling—told me, “Drillers can do everything they need to do safely; there is no reason drilling shouldn’t be as safe as sitting at home in your living room.” It is absolutely possible for everyone to go home from work better than when they came: wealthier through compensation for a job well done and without injury—or having messed up the world.

Figure 4 is like Fig. 3, except instead of having performance measured by average feet per day, we have the fatality rate for Oil and Gas Extraction Workers. (Note: these fatalities are for all oil and gas extraction activities, not just drilling). This figure is sad. When drilling activity goes up, the fatality rate goes up. More activity logically means more people in harm’s way and, unfortunately, more injuries. This plot doesn’t show that. It shows that the busier we are, the higher the fatality rate goes up; not only are there more workers, but they are also harmed more frequently.

There is one small glimmer of hope; we are, on average, getting better. The fatality rate does go down 1.4% per year on average (the “-.014” in the regression). But when activity goes up X%, the fatality rate goes up .65*X%. As we get busier, we are less safe. There might be another reason for hope here, as it seems that we are recently getting a bit better; in 2017, activity went up 70% and the fatality rate “only” increased 25%. However, that’s still where we want (and need) to be. Even still, when we get busier, we perform worse in efficiency and on safety.

What does this mean? We have a big opportunity to advance by transferring capability. In the last column, I presented three things I’m pretty sure are involved in drilling advancements:

Technology: Improved downhole tools and surface equipment move the technical limit forward.

People: Learning curve optimization and ramp up takes more time when you release rigs, with crews that need to “re-learn” when you bring them back.

Process: The evolution of how we work together and the do’s and don’ts that aim for operational excellence help us eliminate loss and waste.

When it comes to performance regressing as activity increases, one way to advance drilling is to find better and more reliable ways to ensure that we transfer the know-how and skills we already have to new workers and new teams. We don’t need to invent new things; we just need to do as well as we already know how and as we have proven we already can do. One way that people are trying to do this is with the principles of “Crew Resource Management” (more on that in the next column).

In the meantime, I hope to start a conversation with any of you on how we can all help Drilling Advance. Please email me at ford.brett@petroskills.com, and I promise I’ll respond.

About the Authors
Ford Brett, P.E.
Contributing Editor
Ford Brett, P.E. , is CEO of PetroSkills. He has consulted in over 45 countries, been granted >35 patents, authored >40 technical publications, and has served as an SPE Distinguished Lecturer, as well as on the on the SPE Board as Drilling and Completions Technical Director.
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