石油价格


去年十月哈马斯袭击以色列时,油价飙升,就像中东爆发武装冲突时经常发生的情况一样。然而,仅仅一周左右之后,价格就回落了。

尽管战争蔓延并波及周边国家,油价仍顽固地维持区间波动,分析师预测,只有真正的供应中断,交易员才会开始担心地缘政治风险。

这一切之所以成为可能,只有一个因素:美国的石油产量。去年这一数字出人意料地强劲增长。许多交易员和分析师似乎都认为今年也会如此。但会吗?

本月早些时候,沙特阿拉伯 命令 阿美公司停止该国石油产能扩张工作。这项工作将使阿美石油公司的最大产能从 1200 万桶/日提高到 1300 万桶/日。但事实证明,利雅得重新考虑了该计划。彭博社很快 指出 ,美国页岩油是沙特“过去十年大部分时间的呕吐物”。

该建议似乎假设美国页岩油产量将继续以去年的强劲速度增长,这令大多数行业观察人士感到惊讶,他们原本预计产量将反映钻井公司新发现的资本纪律并关注股东回报和债务偿还。

这个假设的原因很简单。尽管钻机数量持续减少且新产量支出没有显着增加,但去年的大部分产量还是实现了增长。它们来自于效率的提高,例如水平井更长的支管和改进的钻井技术。一些人提出的问题是这些是否可以维持去年的水平。然而,更重要的问题是,钻探者愿意这样做吗?

路透社约翰·坎普在 本周的专栏中提出了第一个问题 ,市场分析师指出,去年美国石油产量的强劲增长干扰了欧佩克自身减产的预期。

“关键问题,”他写道,“在不增加价格和钻探的情况下,效率提升能够在多长时间内继续推动显着的产量增长。”

如果 达拉斯联储调查 有任何迹象的话,我们很可能会看到今年产出增长率放缓。在最新一期的调查中,达拉斯联储指出,生产商的乐观情绪正在减弱,今年最后一个季度的生产增长率显着放缓。

事实上,能源信息署的数据也 支持了这一点虽然在 2023 年的大部分时间里,产量都在突飞猛进地增长,但在 9 月至 11 月之间的三个月中,产量偶尔会出现小幅下降,但增幅放缓至每天 10 万桶左右,10 月份产量增幅甚至略有下降。

另一方面,EIA 最近 估计 过去两周的产量变化为 70 万桶/日,这表明美国产量增长仍然强劲。但值得注意的是,估计并不是最准确的数字,最终数据,例如 9 月、10 月和 11 月的产量数据,作为未来产量的指标要可靠得多。

生产商是否愿意像去年那样继续扩大产量,这是一个有趣的问题。简而言之,在红海危机期间出口激增的背景下,答案是肯定的。这场危机对美国石油来说是一个福音,因为它阻碍了原油从中东流向欧洲,迫使欧洲向西寻找供应。

危机持续的时间越长,欧洲作为美国原油的超大市场的时间就越长,从而刺激产量增长。但与产量持续增长战略相悖的是对未来需求和投资新产能的好处的怀疑——因为效率的提高迟早是不够的。

还有资源有限的问题。有一种观点反对碳氢化合物的有限性,但这种观点基于这样一种认识,即并非所有石油以任何价格开采都是经济的。换句话说,美国仍有大量原油未开采,但开采这些原油需要达到尚未达到的一定价格水平。简而言之:滴水的甜蜜点已经不多了。在某些时候,钻探商将需要更高的价格或更低的产量。

因此,虽然美国石油产量将继续以惊人速度增长的假设似乎很受欢迎,但这可能不是最安全的假设。目前,它的动力来自去年令人惊讶的产出增长,以及人们认为这些增长将持续下去,因为它们不需要额外的投资。

然而,另一方面,交易员对中国制造业活动更新和国际能源署对石油需求峰值的预测感到担忧,尽管这些预测本身是基于大量假设。这些因素导致价格低迷。美国生产商无法仅靠越来越长的支线来继续增加产量。在某些时候,他们需要开始花费更多资金来生产更多产品——只有在值得的情况下。

作者:Irina Slav for Oilprice.com

 


原文链接/oilandgas360

Oil Price


When last October Hamas attacked Israel, oil prices jumped higher, as always happens when armed conflict breaks out in the Middle East. Just a week or so later, however, prices had retreated.

Even as the war spread and lit up surrounding countries, oil prices remained stubbornly range-bound, with analysts predicting that it would take an actual supply disruption for traders to start caring about geopolitical risk.

All this was made possible by one factor: U.S. oil production. That expanded surprisingly strongly last year. And many traders and analysts alike seem to assume that this year will be the same. But will it?

Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia ordered Aramco to stop work on The Kingdom’s oil production capacity expansion. That work would have raised Aramco’s maximum production capacity from 12 million bpd to 13 million bpd. It turned out, however, that Riyadh had reconsidered the plan. Bloomberg was quick to note the role of U.S. shale as the Saudis’ “nemesis for much of the past decade.”

The suggestion appears to assume that U.S. shale production will continue growing at last year’s robust rate, which surprised most industry watchers who had expected production to reflect drillers’ newfound capital discipline and focus on shareholder returns and debt repayment.

The reason for this assumption is quite simple. Most of the production gains last year came despite a consistently lower rig count and no meaningful increase in spending on new production. They came from efficiency gains such as longer laterals in horizontal wells and improved drilling technology. The question some are asking is whether these could be maintained at last year’s rate. The more important question is, however, will drillers want to do that?

Reuters’ John Kemp posed the first question in a column this week, in which the market analyst noted that the strong increase in U.S. oil output last year had interfered with OPEC’s expectations from its own output cuts.

“The critical question,” he wrote, “is how much longer efficiency gains can keep driving significant output growth without an increase in prices and drilling.”

If the Dallas Fed Survey is any indication, we may well see a slowdown in the rate of output growth this year. In the latest edition of the survey, the Dallas Fed noted waning optimism among producers and a significant slowdown in the growth rate of production over the final quarter of the year.

Indeed, figures from the Energy Information Administration support this. While for much of 2023, production grew by leaps and bounds—with the occasional slight monthly drop—in the three months between September and November, growth slowed to around 100,000 bpd, with October even seeing a slight dip in output growth.

On the other hand, the EIA recently estimated the change in production over the last two weeks at a hefty positive 700,000 bpd, which would signal that U.S. production growth is still going strong. It bears noting, however, that estimates are not the most accurate of figures, and final data, such as the production numbers for September, October, and November are much more reliable as indicators of future production.

The question of whether producers would want to continue expanding their output as strongly as they did last year is an interesting one. The short answer is yes, in the context of surging exports amid the Red Sea crisis. That crisis has been a boon for U.S. oil as it has hampered the movement of crude from the Middle East to Europe, forcing Europe to look west for supply.

The longer the crisis lasts, the longer Europe will remain an extra-big market for U.S. crude, motivating production gains. But countering the strategy of constant output growth are suspicions about future demand and the merit of investment in new production capacity—because sooner or later, efficiency gains will not be enough.

There is also the issue of finite resources. There is an argument against the finite nature of hydrocarbons, but that argument rests on the recognition that not all oil is economical to extract at any price. In other words, there is still plenty of crude untapped in the U.S., but tapping it requires a certain price level that hasn’t yet been reached. In short: dripping sweet spots are running out. At some point, drillers will need either higher prices or lower output.

So, while the assumption that U.S. oil production will continue growing at a breakneck speed seems to be quite popular, it might not be the safest assumption out there. For now, it is being fed by last year’s surprising output gains and a perception that these will continue because they don’t require additional investments.

On the other hand, however, we have traders fretting about demand amid Chinese manufacturing activity updates and IEA forecasts about peak oil demand, even though these are based on massive assumptions themselves. These factors are keeping prices subdued. And U.S. producers can’t keep pumping more with ever-longer laterals alone. At some point, they would need to start spending more to produce more—but only if it’s worth it.

By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com