评论:加减法和其他模糊数学问题

埃克森美孚收购先锋自然资源公司至少暂时削弱了美国独立人士的气势。

埃克森美孚收购先锋自然资源公司至少暂时削弱了美国独立人士的气势。来源:Shutterstock.com

超级巨头埃克森美孚对先锋自然资源公司的收购是二叠纪盆地纯粹经营故事的必然结局。这只是时间问题。

整合是企业发展的关键。在某种程度上,要么每个人都在这么做,要么他们肯定——也许是悄悄地——想要这么做。

这就是大公司变大的方式:在考察了成功但规模较小、更灵活的同行的业绩记录后,他们将其收购。它适用于希望通过并购实现增长的独立生产商——我们报告了今年上半年的交易,当时公共勘探与生产公司吞并了众多私营公司:Diamondback Energy收购了 Lario Permian 和 Firebird Energy;Diamondback Energy 收购了 Lario Permian 和 Firebird Energy;马拉松石油公司收购了 Ensign 自然资源公司;Ovintiv收购了 Black Swan Oil and Gas、PetroLegacy Energy 和 Piedra Resources

最大的鱼来了

现在可能是超级巨头们吃饭的时候了。

埃克森美孚与先锋公司的交易是自 1998 年埃克森美孚以 825 亿美元收购美孚以来上游石油和天然气领域规模最大的交易。600 亿美元的全股票价格击败了西方石油公司 2019 年以570 亿美元收购阿纳达科石油公司的价格。

在某些情况下,一笔大交易的真正价值并不会立即显现出来。正如我们的 A&D 高级编辑 Chris Mathews 所报道的那样,埃克森美孚的最新收购让我们重新审视了这家超级巨头 2010 年以 360 亿美元收购 XTO Energy 时的焦虑。当时,这引起了人们的关注,但今天很难反驳这笔交易的价值。

同样,西方石油公司因收购阿纳达科而受到批评,收购主要由激进股东卡尔·伊坎领导。但该公司及其特氟龙领导者兼首席执行官 Vicki Hollub 如今拥有强大的资产负债表和与其他美国生产商一样多的股东支持。

此外,页岩油生产商之间的这种整合是其企业生命周期的一部分。

埃克森美孚收购宣布几小时后,先锋公司首席执行官斯科特·谢菲尔德(Scott Sheffield)向彭博电视台透露了同样的情况。

“页岩油公司无法靠自己长期生存。他们将不得不合并、整合并成为多元化公司的一部分,”他在 10 月份表示。

由于我们在《石油和天然气投资者》和 HartEnergy.com 上详细研究和报告的所有原因(规模、规模和规模)以及其他一些原因,不可否认的是,整合是一个行业标准。

独立人士和独立人士

先锋的故事则不同。它被埃克森美孚同化是一种损失。

根据定义,独立生产商比控制绝大多数资源和利润的笨拙巨头更灵活、更愿意冒险。

首席执行官斯科特·谢菲尔德(Scott Sheffield)的任期因独立展示而变得斑驳。

谢菲尔德是 2019 年第一位要求其企业和同事对二叠纪盆地天然气猖獗燃烧负责的大型石油和天然气公司的领导人。同年,我报告了我对德克萨斯铁路委员会记录进行六个月分析的结果,证明该机构从未拒绝过生产商燃烧天然气的请求。当我需要写下这个问题时,谢菲尔德是二叠纪地区唯一愿意接听我电话的首席执行官。

他接着告诉我和世界各地的其他几十个人,二叠纪火山喷发是一种“缺失的眼睛”,需要一些治疗。这是大胆的,也是该行业继续在不同层面上努力实现可衡量且有意义的减排的部分原因。

下一位承担此类公共责任的首席执行官是马特·加拉格尔 (Matt Gallagher),他在 2020 年 10 月之前担任 Parsley Energy 的首席执行官。就在那时,先锋公司收购了该公司,并将加拉格尔纳入董事会。

这次激烈的问题并不是先锋公司领导层愿意采取大胆行动并独立采取行动的唯一例子。

该勘探与生产公司是最早对股东对惨淡回报深感普遍焦虑做出反应的公司之一,调整了高管薪酬,使最高管理层的利益与投资者的利益一致,然后引入了可变股息、石油和天然气稀有性。

只要他有想法,他就会公开挑战欧佩克的领导地位。他知道他所在的美国石油和天然气行业可以做什么,并且已经做了什么,影响了全球能源经济并调整了欧佩克的权力。2014年,当该卡特尔试图通过伪价格战破坏页岩油革命时,他对其进行了严厉批评;在大流行的最初几个月,在铁路委员会讨论产量上限时,他是一个受人尊敬、合理的声音。 

谢菲尔德退出聚光灯下,将导致该行业的责任和全球话语权出现空白。但这也为其他石油和天然气高管提供了一个机会,可以在上帝和所有人面前抓住独立的衣钵,进入黄金时期。  

原文链接/hartenergy

Commentary: Addition by Subtraction and Other Fuzzy Math Problems

Exxon Mobil’s acquisition of Pioneer Natural Resources diminishes—at least, temporarily—the swagger of U.S. independents.

Exxon Mobil’s acquisition of Pioneer Natural Resources diminishes—at least, temporarily—the swagger of U.S. independents. (Source: Shutterstock.com)

The absorption of Pioneer Natural Resources by supermajor Exxon Mobil is the inevitable end of the Permian Basin pure play’s story. It was just a matter of timing.

And consolidation is key to corporate growth. To some extent, either everybody’s doing it or they surely—perhaps quietly—want to do it.

That’s how the big guys get bigger: after examining the track record of their successful but smaller, more nimble peers, they buy them up. It works for independent producers that want to grow via M&A—as we reported on deals during the first half of the year when public E&Ps gobbled up a buffet of private companies: Diamondback Energy bought Lario Permian and Firebird Energy; Marathon Oil acquired Ensign Natural Resources; and Ovintiv took out Black Swan Oil and Gas, PetroLegacy Energy and Piedra Resources.

Here come the biggest fish

And now it may be time for the supermajors to dine.

The Exxon-Pioneer deal is the largest in the upstream oil and gas space since Exxon bought Mobil in 1998 for $82.5 billion. The all-stock $60 billion price edged aside Occidental Petroleum’s $57 billion purchase of Anadarko Petroleum in 2019.

In some instances, the real value of a big deal isn’t immediately clear. As Chris Mathews, our A&D senior editor, reported, this latest Exxon acquisition revisited the angst of the supermajor’s 2010 purchase of XTO Energy for $36 billion. At the time, it raised eyebrows, but it’s hard to argue against the deal value today.

Similarly, Occidental came under fire for the Anadarko purchase, led largely by activist shareholder Carl Icahn. But the company—and its Teflon leader, CEO Vicki Hollub—today have a strong balance sheet and as much shareholder support as any other U.S. producer.

Moreover, this sort of consolidation among shale producers is part of their corporate lifespan.

Hours after the Exxon buy was announced, Pioneer CEO Scott Sheffield told Bloomberg Television as much.

“Shale companies cannot survive on their own, long term. They’re going to have to merge up, consolidate and be part of diversified companies,” he said in October.

And for all the reasons we’ve examined and reported on at length inside Oil and Gas Investor and on HartEnergy.com—scale, scale and scale—plus a few others, there is no denying that consolidation is an industry standard.

Independents and independence

The Pioneer story is different. And its assimilation by Exxon is a loss.

By definition, an independent producer is more nimble and risk-taking than the lumbering giants that control the vast majority of resources and profit.

CEO Scott Sheffield’s tenure is dappled by independent displays.

Sheffield was the first leader of a large oil and gas company to, in 2019, hold his business and his peers accountable for the rampant flaring of natural gas in the Permian Basin. That was the same year I had reported on my findings from six months spent analyzing Texas Railroad Commission records that proved the agency had literally never denied a producer’s request to flare natural gas. When it came time for me to write about the issue, Sheffield was the only CEO in the Permian willing to take my call.

He went on to tell me and dozens of others around the world that Permian flaring is a “black eye” that needed some healing. It was bold, and at least part of the reason the industry continues to effort—at various levels—measurable and meaningful reductions.

The next CEO to assume such public accountability was Matt Gallagher, chief at Parsley Energy until October 2020. That’s when Pioneer bought the firm and put Gallagher on its board of directors.

The flaring issue is not the only example of Pioneer’s leadership being willing to make a bold move and to do it independently.

The E&P was among the first to respond to deep and widespread shareholder anxiety over dismal returns, tweaking executive compensation to put the C-suite’s interest in line with those of investors and then introducing a variable dividend, an oil and gas rarity.

He publicly challenges the leadership of OPEC whenever it strikes his fancy. He knows what his sector of the U.S. oil and gas industry can do—and has done—to impact the global energy economy and tweak OPEC’s power. He called out the cartel when it tried to undermine the shale revolution with a pseudo price war in 2014, and he was a respected, reasonable voice during Railroad Commission talks about a production cap during the early months of the pandemic. 

Sheffield’s departure from the limelight will leave a void in the industry’s accountability and its global voice. But it also presents an opportunity for other oil and gas executives to grab the independent mantle in front of God and everybody and step into prime time.